Photo caption: Sultan Ahmad bin Sulayem, the Chairman of DP World of the United Emirates (UAE), and also the Chairman of the Ports, Customs, and Free Zone Corporation (PCFC), seen in the photo enjoying use of holy Kaaba’s cloth (kiswah) as carpet – Photo: United States Department of Justice

There are moments in a nation’s political life when restraint is not timidity but wisdom. Bangladesh, under a Yunus-led interim government, finds itself at precisely such a moment. Interim administrations exist to keep the lights on, not to rearrange the house. Yet the handling of the Chattogram Port’s New Mooring Container Terminal (NCT)—and the flirtation with DP World—suggests an authority overreach that raises troubling questions about sovereignty, transparency, and judgment.

Start with first principles. Chattogram Port is not just another infrastructure asset. It handles roughly 93% of Bangladesh’s imports and exports. It is, in effect, the country’s economic jugular vein. Decisions about who operates its terminals, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters of national sovereignty. They demand democratic legitimacy, parliamentary scrutiny, and public consent. An interim government—unelected, time-bound, and designed to be neutral—has none of these. Even if negotiations stop short of a final signature, advancing a concession framework of this magnitude risks preempting the will of the next elected government.

Then there is the choice of partner. DP World is often presented as a global logistics giant with technical expertise. That is the sales pitch. But reputations in geopolitics are never built on brochures alone. DP World’s activities have been under scrutiny in multiple jurisdictions, with controversies surrounding port concessions, labor practices, and strategic leverage. For a country as geopolitically exposed as Bangladesh—wedged between great-power interests and dependent on uninterrupted trade—due diligence is not optional. It is essential.

Sultan Ahmad bin Sulayem, the Chairman of DP World cooking food for his friend Jeffrey Epstein

This concern was not confined to activists or port workers. According to available accounts, even within the state’s own security establishment there were cautions. Present Chief of Army Staff,  General Waker reportedly advised against rushing into a deal with DP World, recommending deeper scrutiny. When the military’s top brass—traditionally conservative about public interventions—signals discomfort, it should trigger a pause. Instead, the process moved forward, albeit unevenly, under a government that insists it will not finalize the deal. That assurance, while welcome, misses the point. The problem is not only the signing; it is the setting of terms, expectations, and momentum.

The interim government’s defenders argue that no final agreement has been reached, that DP World itself asked for more time to review the draft concession, and that the next government will decide. Technically, this may be true. Politically, it is disingenuous. Negotiations create facts on the ground. Drafts become templates. International partners begin to assume continuity. By the time an elected government takes office, the reversing course becomes diplomatically costly and economically disruptive. Interim hands should not tie permanent knots.

The optics worsened when placed alongside another episode: on the very day of the verdict involving Sheikh Hasina, the government hurriedly signed deals with foreign companies concerning two other ports. Timing matters in politics. To push through opaque agreements on a day of national political shock invites suspicion. Why the haste? Why the silence? Why the lack of parliamentary debate or broad consultation? These are not academic questions. They go to the heart of public trust.

Transparency, in this saga, has been conspicuously thin. Officials speak of government-to-government frameworks, of facilitation by BIDA and the PPP Authority, of High Court clearances. What they do not offer is clarity on risk allocation, labor protections, national security clauses, or exit options. Port workers, understandably, fear job losses and displacement. Protest groups warn of economic and strategic vulnerability. The state’s response has been punitive—suspensions, transfers, cases—rather than persuasive. A confident government argues its case; an insecure one reaches for the baton.

There is also a dimension that policymakers ignore at their peril: public sentiment. Bangladesh is a deeply religious society, where symbolism carries weight. Allegations surrounding DP World’s ownership links to the Epstein scandal—however indirectly—have circulated widely, amplified by claims that the owner gifted the Kaaba’s gilaaf to Epstein, who then posed with it in a manner widely perceived as disrespectful. Whether every detail stands up to forensic scrutiny is almost beside the point. Politics is not a courtroom. Perception shapes legitimacy. When a foreign company associated—rightly or wrongly—with actions that offend religious sensibilities is courted for control over a national lifeline, backlash is inevitable.

None of this is to argue that Bangladesh should shun foreign investment or modern port management. On the contrary, efficiency gains, technology transfer, and global integration are vital. But the “how” matters as much as the “what.” Ports can be modernized through competitive, transparent bidding under an elected government with a clear mandate. Labor concerns can be addressed through binding protections. Sovereignty can be safeguarded through carefully drafted clauses that keep strategic control firmly in national hands. These are not radical ideas; they are standard practice in serious democracies.

The strikes at Chattogram Port, which stranded dozens of ships and inflicted losses estimated in the thousands of crores of taka, are a warning sign. So is the breadth of opposition—from workers’ unions to nationalist groups—who see the proposed lease as “suicidal.” Dismissing them as obstructionists misses the deeper anxiety: that decisions of irreversible consequences are being made by a government that will soon exit the stage.

History offers sobering lessons. Interim or caretaker regimes that overstep their remit rarely age well. They leave behind contested legacies, legal tangles, and social scars. Bangladesh has been here before, and it did not end happily. Prudence, therefore, is not a weakness. It is statesmanship.

The Yunus-led interim government still has time to correct the course. The simplest path is also the soundest: freeze all major port-related negotiations; publish all draft agreements and memoranda for public review; and formally defer decisions to the next elected parliament. Doing so would not scare investors. Serious investors prefer clarity and legitimacy to speed and secrecy.

Ports are about movement—of goods, of capital, of opportunity. But politics, at critical junctures, is about stillness: knowing when not to move. On Chattogram, the interim government would do well to stand still, hands off the wheel, and let the people—through their elected representatives—decide who steers Bangladesh’s most vital gateway to the world.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings