For more than a decade, the United Nations publicly portrayed itself as a neutral humanitarian actor navigating the complexities of Syria’s civil war. Yet buried deep inside a dimly lit hallway of an unremarkable Damascus shopping center sat a company that quietly exposed a troubling contradiction at the heart of the UN’s operations. This company – Shorouk for Protection, Guarding and Security Services – was not simply another local contractor in a war-torn country. According to a vast trove of leaked documents, Shorouk was secretly owned and directed by one of the Syrian regime’s most feared intelligence agencies, even as it collected at least $11 million from UN agencies.

The revelations, uncovered by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and partners in their “Damascus Dossier” investigation, show that UN agencies continued awarding Shorouk contracts long after warnings emerged about its ties to Assad’s security apparatus – the same apparatus responsible for torture, disappearances, and mass repression throughout Syria’s civil war. The story demonstrates how international aid money can become entangled in authoritarian systems, allowing oppressive regimes to profit from global humanitarian efforts while simultaneously surveilling and controlling those who attempt to help.

Shorouk’s official office hardly reflected the influence it wielded. Tucked at the end of an unlit fourth-floor corridor, monitored by a discreet camera, it served as the administrative hub of a company that safeguarded UN buildings across Syria – from the famous Four Seasons Hotel, which became the de facto UN headquarters, to various field hubs.

To outward appearances, Shorouk was a legitimate private security enterprise. Its website boasted of 2,000 employees and a roster of high-profile contracts. But internal documents obtained by ICIJ show that Shorouk was in fact under the direct control of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), one of the Syrian regime’s most brutal arms of power.

The GID has long been associated with enforced disappearances, systematic torture, and extrajudicial killings. UN reports themselves repeatedly documented these abuses. Yet shockingly, many UN agencies were hiring a company secretly “owned and controlled” by this very entity.

Between 2014 and 2024, UN agencies signed more than 130 security contracts and purchase orders with Shorouk. The UN Development Programme alone paid the firm at least $9 million. Additional payments came from the World Health Organization, the World Food Programme, and other UN entities operating in Syria.

Human rights organizations began sounding alarms early. In 2022, both Human Rights Watch and the Syrian Legal Development Programme sent formal warnings to UN officials about multiple reports linking Shorouk to Assad’s intelligence services. Despite these concerns, the UN argued that its procurement processes were sound and claimed no verifiable evidence tied Shorouk to the regime.

However, dozens of leaked internal memos now contradict those assurances.

One document from 2019 shows Shorouk’s general manager, Wael al-Haou, sending a check worth around $100,000 to the intelligence agency – explicitly marked as the GID’s “profit share” from Shorouk’s operations. Another memo from 2021 has al-Haou requesting assistance from a GID director, explaining that Shorouk deserved special treatment because it was “the only company owned and controlled” by the intelligence agency.

Al-Haou has denied that Shorouk was state-owned, insisting he and two unnamed partners were the true owners. But the leaked papers – written in his own hand – tell a different story.

The United Nations, after the revelations became public, claimed that the conditions in Syria severely limited their operational choices. According to the UN country team, Syria’s government routinely revoked private security company licenses, leaving only two firms – Shorouk and another regime-linked company, ProGuard – capable of meeting UN security standards. Both were classified as “high-risk” suppliers, yet they remained the only viable options.

In other words, Assad’s government had engineered a monopoly.

By controlling who could legally operate, the regime effectively forced the UN into funneling millions of dollars to companies that were tied to its own security operations. Meanwhile, Syrian authorities monitored and sometimes directly interfered with UN activities, redirecting aid flows toward pro-regime areas while starving opposition-held communities of assistance.

One leaked memo from intelligence officers reveals that the regime considered any potential re-evaluation of UN contracts a threat to “national security.” Another memo advised lying to the UN by describing the security firms as private companies with no governmental affiliation.

Faisal Mekdad, Syria’s former foreign minister and later vice president, spelled out precisely why these contracts mattered. According to his memo, Shorouk and similar firms were essential tools for “monitoring UN staff” and preventing “suspicious activities” – a phrase long used by the regime to justify surveillance and harassment.

The regime also profited financially in more subtle ways. The UN was required to disburse payments in US dollars to Syria’s Central Bank, which converted them into Syrian pounds at the official exchange rate. Because the official rate was vastly inflated compared to the black market rate, the state pocketed the difference. Mekdad described this openly, noting that the treasury “benefits” from such transactions – even as Syria battled one of the world’s worst economic collapses.

The scandal surrounding Shorouk is not an isolated incident. For years, critics have accused the UN of allowing itself to be manipulated by the Assad regime. Throughout the war, UN agencies were routinely forced to partner with government-approved NGOs and contractors, many of whom were connected to sanctioned regime insiders or intelligence figures.

Investigations by various outlets, including The Guardian, showed that the UN hired relatives and allies of senior Syrian officials. Mekdad’s own brother worked as a liaison for the UN refugee agency. His wife served as a consultant to the World Health Organization.

Although the UN insisted it followed all procurement policies, the system was deeply flawed. Because UN sanctions apply only to individuals or entities blacklisted by the Security Council, and because Russia and China repeatedly shielded Assad officials from such sanctions, many regime-linked companies remained eligible for UN contracts. Compounding the problem, regime insiders often registered companies under the names of civilians to hide ownership. The Damascus Dossier contains over a dozen signed declarations from individuals admitting they were “owners on paper” only.

A former UN official, speaking anonymously, criticized the organization’s approach:
“If the UN claims Syria was a complex environment, then it was their responsibility to investigate that complexity rather than ignore it.”

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in December 2024, many expected firms like Shorouk to disappear alongside it. Instead, the company swiftly rebranded. Within weeks, it adopted a new logo featuring Syria’s post-Assad flag and began posting job advertisements as if nothing had happened.

Al-Haou insisted that the new Syrian authorities reviewed and approved Shorouk’s continued operations. But the leaked documents suggest a long-standing pattern of deception and intelligence collaboration that did not vanish with a simple change of branding.

More troubling, the UN still employs Shorouk as a contractor, despite the overwhelming documentation now available.

ICIJ’s investigation shows that Syrian intelligence actively strategized on how to obscure Shorouk’s true identity. Officers drafted responses to Human Rights Watch that were never sent. They debated how to pressure UN officials without appearing too coercive. They emphasized the need to conceal employees’ identities to avoid exposing security staff working undercover.

Even when the UN began reconsidering its contracts in 2022, Syrian intelligence monitored the process closely. The regime worked behind the scenes to keep the payments flowing – and succeeded. Shorouk was awarded more UN money in 2023 and 2024 than in any previous year.

This pattern illustrates not only the Syrian regime’s deep penetration of international operations but also the UN’s chronic vulnerability to manipulation in restrictive environments.

The revelations have triggered renewed calls for deep reform of UN procurement systems. Human rights advocates argue that the UN – which relies on global trust – cannot risk being complicit in funding security apparatuses responsible for crimes against humanity.

Emma Beals, a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, summarized the consequences starkly:

“UN money went directly into a regime’s pocket to fund the same apparatus that detained and murdered tens of thousands of Syrians.”

The UN insists it followed its procedures, but the scandal exposes a larger structural problem: in authoritarian states, the lines between public, private, and military institutions are intentionally blurred. Without robust investigative capabilities – or the willingness to challenge governments – international organizations risk becoming financiers of the very abuses they condemn.

The case of Shorouk for Protection, Guarding and Security Services is more than a procurement failure. It is a window into how humanitarian systems can be exploited by regimes skilled in manipulating bureaucracy and international norms. For years, the UN believed it was hiring private contractors to secure its facilities. In reality, it was funding an intelligence network that monitored its own staff, profited from inflated currency controls, and contributed to a machinery of oppression.

The investigation raises urgent questions about accountability, transparency, and the future of UN operations in authoritarian or conflict-affected countries. Most importantly, it reveals how easily humanitarian aid – meant to protect civilians – can be diverted into the hands of those who have brutalized them.

Until the UN confronts these failures, the ghosts of Syria’s civil war will continue to haunt its credibility.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings