When a red-decked cargo vessel was spotted earlier this year loading grain at a Russian-occupied port in Ukraine, few realized that the ship’s story stretched far beyond the Black Sea. What seemed like another case of sanctions-busting maritime trade has now unraveled into a complex web of secret deals, offshore companies, and political corruption that ties directly to the crumbling remnants of Bashar al-Assad’s fallen regime in Syria.

At the center of this intrigue are three Syrian cargo ships – the Finikia, the Laodicea, and the Souria – vessels once proudly owned by the Syrian state but now accused of smuggling Ukrainian grain stolen from territories occupied by Russia. Investigations by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and its Syrian partner SIRAJ have revealed that the ships’ ownership was quietly transferred to a shadowy Seychelles-based company, AlHouda Holding, in a set of deals that appear designed to hide their true beneficiaries and circumvent international sanctions.

On the surface, these transactions looked like legitimate privatizations. But closer examination shows they were part of a much larger pattern of asset stripping, manipulation, and secrecy that characterized the final years of Assad’s rule – and continues to echo through global shipping lanes long after his ouster.

The Syrian General Authority for Maritime Transport, a government agency that once oversaw the country’s merchant fleet, sold the Finikia and the Souria to AlHouda Holding in April 2023 for the token price of just one US dollar each. Around the same time, the Laodicea – another ship of the same class – was transferred under similar circumstances.

In the world of maritime trade, where large cargo freighters are typically worth millions of dollars, such symbolic pricing immediately raised suspicions. Documents obtained by OCCRP and SIRAJ show that the man who signed the sale contracts for AlHouda Holding was a Syrian businessman named Ali Mohamed Deeb, whose business interests were deeply entwined with Assad’s patronage networks.

According to sanctions specialist Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola, the transactions bore all the hallmarks of a deliberate scheme to move state assets beyond the reach of future investigations or sanctions. “Selling multi-million-dollar vessels for $1 is not just symbolic – it’s a way to erase them from public balance sheets while keeping control within the same elite circle,” he explained. “This is a textbook case of how the Assad regime privatized the state for its own survival.”

Deeb’s involvement turned out to be a critical clue. Corporate records show that he served as chairman of Iloma Investment Private JSC, a company that took over the operations of state-owned Syrian Airlines in 2024 and was later sanctioned by the European Union for acting as “a front for the Assad family.” He also held shares in at least eight other Syrian firms created between 2021 and 2024, several of which were co-owned by businessmen sanctioned for supporting Assad’s regime.

Among them was Ali Najib Ibrahim, a telecommunications investor accused of running shell companies to evade sanctions; Ahmad Khalil Khalil, a co-owner of a private security firm tied to Russian energy interests and the Wagner Group; and Nasser Deeb Deeb, another Assad ally with overlapping business ties.

The evidence suggests that the $1 ship sales were not independent commercial transactions, but rather another instance of the Assad family’s long-standing practice of transferring public wealth into private offshore vehicles – effectively laundering the assets of the Syrian state through secrecy jurisdictions like the Seychelles.

Following their suspicious sale, the three freighters disappeared from public maritime databases, only to reappear months later under new names and different national flags. The Finikia became the Monte Bianco and later the Bayaze D; the Souria turned into the San Damian; and the Laodicea re-emerged as the Monte Rosa.

Each vessel switched its registration multiple times – from Syria to Eswatini, to Gambia, and even to East Timor – in what maritime analysts call “flag-hopping,” a tactic used by ships engaged in illicit trade to avoid detection and restrictions. In some cases, the countries whose flags they flew were not even aware of the registrations.

Eswatini, a landlocked African nation with no coastline, rescinded the registrations in early 2024 after discovering the deception. Yet the ships continued to use its flag for months afterward. “These ships are essentially stateless,” said maritime expert Michelle Bockmann of the analytics firm Windward. “They exist in a gray zone, sailing without oversight, insurance, or accountability – a danger not only to global trade but also to maritime safety and the environment.”

Satellite imagery provided by maritime intelligence firm Vantor confirmed that the Finikia – renamed Monte Bianco – was moored at the Avlita terminal in Russian-occupied Sevastopol in January 2025, just weeks after being sanctioned by the European Union for its role in transporting stolen Ukrainian grain. Ukrainian officials say it is one of several ships helping Russia export agricultural products looted from occupied regions.

The trail of ownership becomes murkier still when the Finikia’s subsequent transfer is examined. In January 2025, records show the ship was registered to Levant Fleet LLC-FZ, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. While little is known about its corporate structure, journalists discovered striking similarities to two other firms – one in the United Kingdom and another in Panama – both owned by Taher Kayali, a Syrian businessman notorious for his role in the global Captagon trade.

Captagon, a powerful amphetamine, has become one of the Middle East’s most profitable illicit exports. Western governments have long accused Assad’s regime of using it to fund its war machine during the Syrian civil war. Kayali, who has been sanctioned by the US, UK, and EU, is described as a “business magnate with deep ties to the Captagon industry.”

His British company, Levant Fleet Ltd, managed the Finikia, Souria, and Laodicea even after his resignation in 2023 – suggesting he maintained influence through intermediaries. The same network appeared across multiple jurisdictions, including Panama and Syria, where Kayali owned Orient Fleet Maritime LLC, a firm whose documents show shared personnel with Levant Fleet entities abroad.

When reporters attempted to contact the companies, they received a cryptic response from a Syrian number using the name “Neptunus” – another of Kayali’s sanctioned firms. The sender promised to supply “all necessary documents,” but none were ever provided.

By September 2025, the Finikia’s ownership shifted once again – this time to Bayaze Shipping Ltd, a newly incorporated company in the Marshall Islands, another jurisdiction favored by sanctions evaders for its secrecy laws.

Even as ownership changed on paper, the ships’ physical movements told a consistent story.

The Finikia – or Bayaze D, as it was later called – was repeatedly sighted sailing between Russian and Syrian ports. Satellite imagery showed it near Sevastopol, Crimea, in January 2025; off the coast of Cyprus in June; and crossing the Bosphorus en route to Russia’s Kavkaz port in July.

The Souria, still flying a false Eswatini flag, made a voyage from Russia’s Kavkaz port to Egypt’s Alexandria port in late 2024 before being tracked to Syria’s Latakia port in mid-2025. The Laodicea was also observed near occupied Simferopol in 2024, later turning up in Lebanese waters after months of operating “dark” – with its tracking system switched off.

At one point, journalists from SIRAJ physically spotted the Laodicea anchored in Latakia, its new name, Monte Rosa, partially obscured by a tarp hung over its hull. The attempt to hide its identity was futile; the name remained visible on one of its lifeboats.

According to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, sanctions commissioner for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, all three ships are part of a fleet assisting Russia in exporting grain from occupied Ukrainian territories. “This is not just about stolen wheat,” Vlasiuk said. “It’s about the global reach of state-sponsored corruption – how the remnants of Assad’s regime are still enriching themselves through the exploitation of war.”

Even after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, his financial networks appear alive and functioning. The transfer of these ships, their connection to sanctioned Syrian businessmen, and their continued involvement in illegal trade demonstrate how deeply entrenched the regime’s economic system remains.

In May 2025, Syria’s new president, Ahmed Al Sharaa, announced a commission to recover state assets stolen under Assad. But aside from vague promises of accountability, the transitional government has shown little progress or transparency. Assad himself remains in exile in Russia, beyond the reach of justice, while his offshore holdings and secret companies continue to operate in various jurisdictions.

Analysts say the ships’ story is emblematic of the broader collapse of Syrian governance. What were once public assets serving national development were converted into private tools of profit and evasion. “The vessels are floating monuments to how a state eats itself,” said Maresca di Serracapriola. “Even now, years after Assad’s fall, his networks navigate international waters with impunity – ghosts of a regime that refused to die.”

Today, the Finikia, Souria, and Laodicea continue to ply global trade routes, their names and flags changing as easily as their registered owners. Beneath their rusted hulls lies a story of power, theft, and survival – of how the fortunes of a dictator can be scattered across the seas, hidden in paperwork, and yet still traceable to the fingerprints of those who once ruled a country through fear.

As the Syrian people struggle to rebuild and Ukraine fights to reclaim its sovereignty, the same network of deception sails on, carrying not just stolen grain, but the enduring legacy of a regime that learned how to plunder both its own nation and others – one ship at a time.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings