The September 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin marked a turning point not just for the organization itself but also for global geopolitics. While the SCO has long been seen as a regional forum largely overshadowed by BRICS, the Tianjin summit managed to grab unprecedented attention from Western policymakers, analysts, and media outlets. The reasons for this go beyond routine diplomacy. What happened in Tianjin-and the signals it sent-showed that Eurasia is no longer willing to remain confined to traditional power dynamics shaped by the West. Instead, countries are increasingly experimenting with mechanisms to navigate old rivalries, forge new bonds, and reimagine multipolarity on their own terms.

Among the most striking developments at the summit was the thaw-however tentative-between India and China. The two Asian giants, whose relationship has been marred by territorial disputes, military standoffs, and competing strategic visions, showed cautious willingness to seek areas of convergence. Whether this signals the beginning of a deeper rapprochement or just a tactical pause remains an open question. Yet, it is precisely this possibility of recalibration that has unsettled Washington and its allies, who have long hoped to keep India firmly aligned against Beijing.

For years, BRICS has been the grouping that commanded Western scrutiny. With members spanning four continents, the establishment of the New Development Bank, moves to settle trade in national currencies, and calls to reduce dependence on the US dollar, BRICS openly challenged the Western financial order. The SCO, in contrast, remained geographically confined to Eurasia, often dismissed as a talking shop dominated by China and Russia, with India and Pakistan seen as late and reluctant entrants.

The Tianjin summit changed this perception. China deliberately staged the gathering as a spectacle of power projection, much like it did during the 2008 Olympics to showcase its economic rise. This time, however, the message was military. The massive parade of advanced weaponry sent a direct signal to the United States: the balance of power in the western Pacific has shifted. Washington took note, with even President Donald Trump acknowledging that he had watched the parade and found it “impressive.” Whether the display nudges the US toward accommodation of China’s regional interests or provokes a counter-escalation remains to be seen, but the symbolism was unmistakable.

The West also noticed because of India’s role. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation, coming after a prolonged downturn in US-India relations, suggested that New Delhi was willing to assert its strategic autonomy more boldly. For Washington, which has long cast India as a key partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy to counterbalance China, the sight of Modi and Xi Jinping in dialogue-followed by a visibly warm interaction with Vladimir Putin-was unsettling.

India’s calculus is complex. On the one hand, it faces direct security threats from China, including unresolved border tensions and Beijing’s growing influence in South Asia. On the other, India cannot afford to cut itself off from economic engagement with its largest neighbor. Bilateral trade remains significant, and India’s domestic economic growth depends on stable regional conditions.

The Quad and the Indo-Pacific framework have provided New Delhi with leverage, allowing it to counter Chinese assertiveness through partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia. But Modi’s Tianjin visit underscored India’s unwillingness to be boxed into a purely anti-China camp. Just as the US maintains deep trade ties with Beijing despite military competition, India, too, seeks to avoid outright confrontation.

This approach is not just tactical but also rooted in long-term strategic thinking. For India, strategic autonomy means keeping all options open-engaging the USwhen interests align, but also exploring rapprochement with China and maintaining robust ties with Russia. The Tianjin summit embodied this balancing act.

The meeting between Modi and Xi Jinping in Tianjin-their second since the Ladakh standoff of 2020-was never expected to deliver dramatic breakthroughs. Instead, the objective was more modest: to create an atmosphere where peace and tranquility on the border could be sustained, even if underlying disputes remain unresolved.

Reports suggest that preliminary understandings were reached during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s earlier visit to India, paving the way for this high-level dialogue. The hour-long conversation between Modi and Xi emphasized adapted border arrangements and incremental confidence-building. While this may seem limited, in the context of years of strained ties, even small steps toward normalization matter.

Importantly, the optics were carefully managed. Following the Modi-Putin interaction, the sight of Modi, Putin, and Xi together in relaxed conversation was a deliberate show of trilateral warmth. For the US, which had hoped to consolidate India firmly within its orbit, this image was a wake-up call: Eurasia is capable of generating its own alignments, independent of Western designs.

Equally significant at Tianjin was the India-Russia engagement. Modi’s private conversation with Putin-conducted in the Russian leader’s personal car-was not just symbolic but substantive. India’s refusal to bow to US pressure on Russian oil imports has already demonstrated New Delhi’s willingness to pay a diplomatic price for its national interests. The warm rapport in Tianjin reaffirmed the durability of the India-Russia partnership.

For Putin, India provides a crucial counterweight to overreliance on China, especially as Moscow navigates Western sanctions and the prolonged Ukraine conflict. For Modi, Russia remains indispensable as a defense supplier and a trusted partner in multipolar forums. The upcoming India-Russia annual summit in December promises to deepen this trajectory.

The trilateral moment-Modi, Putin, and Xi walking together-was therefore more than mere optics. It hinted at the possibility of reviving the Russia-India-China dialogue, once seen as a building block of a multipolar world. For Washington, the prospect of such a trilateral becoming more functional is deeply disconcerting.

Beyond high politics, Modi’s address at the SCO plenary touched on themes that resonate across the organization. Terrorism, extremism, and separatism remain shared threats for SCO members. Referring to the Pahalgam attack, Modi stressed that double standards on terrorism were unacceptable-a subtle rebuke to Pakistan’s perceived ambivalence.

On connectivity, Modi highlighted projects like the Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor, which can link India to Central Asia and beyond. However, his warning that connectivity must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity was a clear dig at the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which India opposes.

Equally noteworthy was Modi’s proposal for a Civilizational Dialogue Forum under the SCO, rooted in shared Buddhist heritage. This soft power initiative aligns with India’s attempt to frame itself as a cultural bridge across Eurasia, while also appealing to the SCO’s self-image as a grouping of “civilizational states.”

The Tianjin summit elevated the SCO’s global profile in a way few anticipated. By serving as a platform for China to showcase military might, India to assert strategic autonomy, Russia to reaffirm partnerships, and other members to emphasize shared concerns, the SCO transcended its earlier image as a regional security forum. It emerged instead as part of the larger multipolar momentum challenging US dominance.

For the West, the implications are sobering. If India and China can find even limited ways to manage their divides within forums like the SCO, the US strategy of using New Delhi as a counterbalance to Beijing could lose traction. A functional Eurasian bloc-rooted in pragmatism, not ideology-would mark a profound shift in the global order.

Of course, many hurdles remain. Border disputes between India and China are unresolved. Trust deficits run deep. Russia’s entanglement in Ukraine complicates trilateral coordination. Pakistan’s role in the SCO ensures continued friction. Yet, the Tianjin summit demonstrated that even adversarial neighbors can explore coexistence when larger geopolitical currents demand it.

Can India and China finally bridge their deep divides? The honest answer is: not yet, and perhaps not fully. But what Tianjin showed is that the two sides are at least willing to keep channels open, manage tensions, and engage within multipolar frameworks like the SCO.

For India, this is about maximizing autonomy in a polarized world. For China, it is about preventing encirclement and showcasing strength. For Russia, it is about keeping both partners close. Together, these imperatives create a fragile but real incentive to prevent rivalries from spiraling into open conflict.

The SCO’s rise in prominence, catalyzed by the Tianjin summit, suggests that Eurasia is no longer just a chessboard for great-power competition-it is becoming an active player shaping the contours of a multipolar future. If India and China can navigate their divides pragmatically, the consequences will reverberate far beyond Asia, forcing the West to reckon with a world that no longer revolves around its dominance.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings