Türkiye’s foreign policy has long been a subject of fascination, frustration, and sometimes confusion for global observers. Its trajectory over the past two decades-whether described as hedging, balancing, or bargaining-defies easy categorization. While some critics argue that Ankara’s approach is contradictory, others see it as a sophisticated recalibration in response to a changing international order. Either way, Türkiye has emerged as one of the few countries capable of straddling both the Western and non-Western worlds, not by accident, but by deliberate design.

The debate over Türkiye’s multivector strategy took center stage in 2013, when Ankara joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a dialogue partner. The move baffled Western capitals. As a NATO member since 1952, Türkiye’s flirtation with what many in the West considered an “anti-NATO bloc” was interpreted as a provocation. Commentators at the time dismissed the gesture as a bluff by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, aimed at pressuring NATO and the EU after years of stalled negotiations.

Yet more than a decade later, it has become clear that Ankara’s pivot was never merely tactical. Instead, it was a calculated signal that Türkiye would not allow itself to be confined to the Western orbit alone. By pursuing avenues in organizations like the SCO and, more recently, expressing interest in BRICS membership, Türkiye demonstrated its intent to expand its geopolitical options beyond the Euro-Atlantic alliance system.

Erdo?an’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in China this past week underscores this long-term strategy. Although Türkiye is unlikely to become a full member-its NATO commitments create structural constraints-the symbolism of its presence is undeniable. Türkiye is the only NATO member with SCO dialogue partner status and the only candidate country still formally seeking EU accession. At the same time, it is the first NATO member to signal interest in joining BRICS, the Russia- and China-led economic bloc.

For Ankara, observer or dialogue status in these organizations is not about replacing its ties with the West, but about creating additional leverage. As Erdo?an himself reiterated, Türkiye’s engagement with non-Western blocs should not be seen as an alternative to NATO or EU membership, but as a complementary effort.

On the sidelines of the Tianjin summit, Erdo?an held bilateral talks with Russia, China, and Iran-three powers deeply entangled in regional crises. This was not a coincidence. Türkiye occupies a unique position in contemporary geopolitics: geographically at the intersection of the Ukraine war, the Syria conflict, and tensions between Israel and Iran. Unlike Western capitals, which often see these crises in zero-sum terms, Ankara’s approach has been more flexible and pragmatic.

Türkiye has supplied drones to Ukraine while simultaneously expanding economic ties with Moscow, even as Western countries enforce sweeping sanctions. It has managed to sustain dialogue with Tehran while containing Iranian influence that directly threatens its interests. With China, Türkiye balances economic cooperation with cautious awareness of Beijing’s broader ambitions.

This compartmentalization of issues is a hallmark of Türkiye’s strategy. Where Western powers struggle to separate cooperation from rivalry, Ankara pursues both simultaneously. This enables Türkiye to mediate between adversaries and expand its room for maneuver without committing fully to one side or the other.

The evolution of Türkiye’s foreign policy cannot be understood without reference to its domestic political transformation, particularly after the failed coup attempt in 2016. That moment reshaped the priorities of the ruling political elite. The Erdo?an administration not only tightened its grip on domestic politics but also sought to carve out greater autonomy on the global stage.

For much of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, Türkiye was firmly anchored in the Western camp, functioning as NATO’s southeastern flank. However, the lack of progress in EU accession, combined with persistent Western criticism of Ankara’s internal politics, eroded enthusiasm for an exclusively Western orientation. By contrast, engagement with Russia, China, and regional powers like Iran offered Türkiye both economic opportunities and political leverage.

This shift does not mean Türkiye is abandoning the West. On the contrary, it continues to value its NATO membership and security guarantees. But it no longer views its Western commitments as exclusive. Instead, it sees benefit in diversifying its partnerships-a recognition that global power is gradually diffusing from West to non-West.

Türkiye’s current strategy is often misunderstood as bridge-building between rival blocs. Yet a closer look suggests otherwise. Rather than mediating for the sake of reconciliation, Türkiye is pursuing a dual-track approach: engaging with the West and non-West along separate agendas. Its drone sales to Ukraine serve one agenda; its trade with Russia serves another. Its desire to join BRICS aligns with one track, while its NATO membership anchors the other.

This dual-track model reflects Türkiye’s pragmatic reading of international politics. In a world marked by uncertainty and shifting power balances, Ankara prefers flexibility over rigid alignment. It does not seek ideological allies but practical arrangements that advance its interests. This approach allows Türkiye to exploit contradictions between greater powers to enhance its own middle-power status.

Still, Türkiye’s multivector strategy is not without risks. Its maneuvering sometimes creates suspicion on both sides. Western capitals question Ankara’s reliability as a NATO ally, while Moscow and Beijing remain cautious of Türkiye’s deep-rooted Western ties. Moreover, Ankara’s balancing act is resource-intensive, requiring careful diplomacy to avoid overreach.

Yet for all these challenges, the benefits remain significant. Türkiye’s ability to engage with multiple poles simultaneously has given it a relevance that few middle powers can claim. Its geography, combined with its willingness to compartmentalize issues, ensures that it remains an indispensable player in crises ranging from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Türkiye’s foreign policy today reflects both necessity and choice. It is a necessity because the global balance of power is shifting, and reliance on a single bloc could leave Türkiye vulnerable. It is a choice because the country’s ruling elite views international politics through a lens of pragmatism rather than ideology.

Whether in NATO meetings in Brussels or SCO summits in China, Türkiye is signaling that it refuses to be boxed into one camp. This multivector approach is not easy to decipher, but it is deliberate. By simultaneously engaging with the West and non-West, Ankara is carving out a unique space for itself in a rapidly changing international order.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings