Sanctions are not merely a diplomatic tool; they are instruments of pressure that shape lives, economies, and political trajectories. For years, Syria has lived under the heavy weight of US-led sanctions. But now, a unique moment presents itself: an opportunity to recalibrate the international community’s stance, particularly the United States’, in light of the rise of a new Syrian government under President Ahmad Al-Sharaa.

While lifting sanctions on Syria remains a controversial move, especially given Washington’s historical reluctance to ease punitive measures without extensive evaluation, there are compelling reasons to consider such a shift. These are rooted not only in geopolitical pragmatism but also in the pressing humanitarian and strategic imperatives that now confront the region.

One of the most pragmatic arguments in favor of lifting sanctions is simple: the Al-Sharaa government is now a political reality. Just as the world has had to come to terms with complex regimes across the Middle East – many of which have elements of militia integration, contested legitimacy, or imperfect democracies – Syria’s current leadership deserves recognition if only to prevent further disintegration.

The notion that Syria can return to pre-conflict normalcy or undergo a complete democratic overhaul is a fantasy long abandoned by regional and international actors. The war has exhausted its population, decimated infrastructure, and fractured social cohesion. At this juncture, the cost of maintaining sanctions – which hurt ordinary Syrians more than elites – may outweigh their intended political leverage.

Perhaps the most transformative shift resulting from the new leadership is the noticeable reduction of Iranian influence in Damascus. For years, Iran’s deep entrenchment in Syria posed threats not only to Syrian sovereignty but also to the balance of power in the Levant. Tehran’s support of Hezbollah, its use of Syrian territory as a military corridor, and its ideological export have long been concerns for both Arab states and Israel.

The ascendance of the Al-Sharaa government and its apparent distancing from Iranian patronage mark a rare and crucial geopolitical shift. To weaken or isolate this government now could risk undoing one of the most significant developments in recent regional history. A destabilized Damascus could once again become fertile ground for Iranian proxies, chaos, or worse – both.

It is far easier to reimpose sanctions than to lift them. This gives Washington and its allies a flexible mechanism to reward compliance and punish regression. By lifting sanctions conditionally and temporarily, the international community sends a message that cooperation will be met with incentives, not just threats.

Failure to act now may lead to unintended consequences. A continued sanctions regime risks pushing Damascus into alliances that counter Western interests, perhaps towards Russia, China, or even renewed ties with Tehran. Additionally, prolonged sanctions can create the very instability the West claims to want to avoid – unrest, rebellion, extremism, and mass migration.

Unlike Afghanistan, Syria exists in a strategic neighborhood. It is hemmed in by countries with vested security interests – most notably Israel, which has emerged as a central actor shaping regional dynamics. Israeli military superiority and intelligence capabilities make it a de facto guarantor of its own borders and security interests.

Israel has made it clear where its red lines lie: no advanced weaponry near its borders, no Iranian-backed militias, and no Hezbollah corridor. These constraints are already being internalized in Damascus, where the new government appears to be recalibrating its foreign policy accordingly. In this context, comparing Syria to Taliban-led Afghanistan – as some in Washington do – is not only inaccurate, but also misleading.

Despite the cautious tone in Washington, President Donald Trump expressed tentative support for easing sanctions – contingent on five key conditions: expelling foreign fighters, combating terrorism, removing Palestinian factions, managing Daesh detention centers, and opening relations with Israel. Each of these serves US and regional interests and, crucially, is achievable.

On foreign fighters and terrorism, the Al-Sharaa government has made gestures of compliance, cracking down on extremist cells and initiating talks with regional partners. The Palestinian factions, many of which were instruments of the Assad regime rather than independent actors, are already being marginalized or expelled – similar to what Jordan has done in the past.

As for Israel, perhaps the most sensitive issue, President Al-Sharaa has voiced openness to diplomatic engagement under the umbrella of the Arab Peace Initiative. This is not an outlier stance – Egypt and Jordan already have formal peace treaties with Israel, and the Abraham Accords have changed the diplomatic landscape. The Syrian leadership’s willingness to even entertain this discussion is a signal of its strategic recalibration.

Critics argue that the new leadership emerged from individuals with links to previously sanctioned entities or ideologies. While these concerns are not unfounded, it is also true that revolutionary transitions often bring forward figures from within the old guard. What matters now is not past affiliations but present actions and future commitments.

Syria today stands at a crossroads. The dark tunnel of war may be behind it, but the exit to lasting peace and stability remains elusive. Economic collapse, social unrest, and regional meddling threaten to pull it back into the abyss. The best way forward is not by extending punishment, but by offering a structured and monitored path to rehabilitation.

Arab nations increasingly understand this. They are beginning to normalize ties with Damascus, driven by a mix of security concerns and economic interests. The Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, played a key role in opening channels of communication with Washington on Syria’s behalf. Their message is clear: engaging Damascus now may prevent a bigger crisis later.

If sanctions remain in place, the potential for chaos grows. Disillusionment could swell into rebellion, extremist groups might find fertile ground, and refugees will continue pouring across borders. Moreover, the economic degradation could lead to a failed state scenario – one that will be far harder and more expensive to address later.

By contrast, a gradual lifting of sanctions, tethered to specific benchmarks and reviewed periodically, allows the international community to test Damascus’ intentions while providing breathing space for recovery. If Al-Sharaa fails to meet expectations, sanctions can return. But if he does, the entire region benefits.

Lifting sanctions on Syria is not a reward. It is a strategic gamble – but a calculated one. The alternative is to wait until the situation deteriorates further, until the human cost becomes unbearable, and until adversaries exploit the vacuum. President Ahmad Al-Sharaa may not be the ideal leader, but he is currently the only one positioned to stabilize Syria.

Sanctions are a blunt instrument. They should not become an obstacle to peace when the opportunity for a fragile but necessary stability is within reach. The time to act is now – before the window closes and Syria becomes once again a battleground of regional and ideological wars.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings