Africa’s choice: Why the US must rethink its strategy to compete with China

In a revealing interview with Fox News anchor Bret Baier, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi offered a blunt assessment of America’s declining influence in Africa. Tshisekedi noted that China’s dominance on the continent is not necessarily the result of Beijing’s growing power, but rather a symptom of America’s retreat. His observation is backed by clear data: in 2000, the United States was Africa’s largest trading partner. Today, China’s trade with Africa is more than four times larger than that of the US.

Tshisekedi’s words strike at the heart of an uncomfortable truth. While the US has hosted only two US-Africa Leaders Summits – one in 2014 and another in 2022 – China is preparing for its 10th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2027. Furthermore, a Gallup poll published last year showed that for the first time, China’s approval rating in Africa (58%) edged past that of the US (56%). These numbers are not just symbolic; they represent real shifts in economic, diplomatic, and political alignments.

Tshisekedi indicated that his country would be “very happy” to see a renewed American commercial presence. However, the current direction of US policy under President Donald Trump could deepen the very decline Tshisekedi warns against. Reports suggesting that the Trump administration plans to close several US embassies and consulates across Africa will only worsen America’s retreat from the continent.

For 25 years, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) served as the backbone of US-Africa commercial relations. By allowing over 6,000 African products to enter the US duty- and quota-free, AGOA aimed to move Africa’s relationship with America from aid to trade. African nations exported more than $100 billion worth of goods to the US between 2001 and 2022 under this framework. American companies like Levi’s, Gap, and Walmart benefitted greatly, sourcing affordable goods from Africa’s developing economies.

Importantly, AGOA was designed with conditions promoting political pluralism, economic liberalization, and good governance. Studies consistently show that trade ties under AGOA have boosted labor productivity, encouraged value-added production, and increased employment across Africa.

Yet in early 2025, Trump introduced “reciprocal” tariffs against many African countries – ironically targeting some of AGOA’s top-performing participants. Lesotho faced a 50% tariff, Madagascar 47%, and Mauritius 40%. Meanwhile, nations disqualified from AGOA benefits – often because of governance failures – faced far lighter penalties. Though Trump later suspended most of these tariffs and opened a 90-day window to renegotiate terms, the damage to trust was done.

In a scramble to preserve access to the American market, countries like Lesotho made swift concessions, granting Elon Musk’s Starlink a 10-year license to operate its satellite network. Yet these quick political wins are unlikely to build the durable commercial relationships the US needs to compete with China.

Instead, African leaders are increasingly pivoting inward. At a recent meeting, African trade ministers agreed to accelerate efforts to promote intra-African trade and diversify exports, aiming to reduce dependence on any single foreign market. Initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are already reshaping how African nations think about economic growth – placing regional integration over reliance on traditional partners like the US.

Moreover, America’s broader footprint on the continent is shrinking rapidly. Trump’s administration has overseen the shuttering of vital programs such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) offices, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and even Voice of America broadcasts. The lapse of major humanitarian initiatives like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) marks another symbolic retreat from a decades-long engagement that once saved millions of African lives.

Nevertheless, there remains a narrow window of opportunity for the US to recalibrate its strategy. Trump’s most pressing interest in Africa is access to critical minerals – and on this front, the continent holds unmatched leverage. The DRC, for example, possesses the richest copper deposits globally and hosts four of the five largest cobalt mines. Similarly, Gabon, Zambia, South Africa, and Chad are key players in the global critical minerals race.

Negotiations are already underway between Washington and several African governments for access to these vital resources. However, the US is playing catch-up. Chinese firms dominate African mining: state-owned enterprises and banks control around 80% of DRC’s cobalt output, and about 90% of the world’s cobalt refining takes place in China. In stark contrast, the US refines less than 1% of the global cobalt supply.

Recognizing this gap, former President Biden’s administration launched the Lobito Corridor initiative – a plan to expand a rail line from Angola’s Atlantic port through the DRC’s mining heartland to Zambia. Encouragingly, Trump’s administration has indicated continued support for this project, envisioning it as a means of upgrading African infrastructure while fostering partnerships between the US, the European Union, African governments, and African-led financing institutions like the Africa Finance Corporation.

But infrastructure alone will not solve America’s diminishing influence. African governments must insist that any minerals deal also boosts local economies through value-added production. Instead of merely exporting raw cobalt, African countries could process the mineral into battery precursors and other semi-finished goods before shipping them abroad.

Here lies an important differentiator: while China has largely resisted calls for local value addition, the US could offer Africa a more equitable partnership by building processing plants and manufacturing facilities on the continent. This would align closely with the goals of AfCFTA – promoting regional industrialization and manufacturing independence.

For Washington, supporting African industrial growth is not charity; it is strategic self-interest. As global demand for electric vehicles, renewable energy technologies, and advanced electronics explodes, securing a reliable and ethical supply of critical minerals is paramount. Building local processing capacity also reduces geopolitical risks – ensuring that minerals don’t become hostage to future political crises or market disruptions.

Furthermore, strengthening Africa’s manufacturing sector could yield broader economic benefits for the US. A more prosperous Africa would mean stronger markets for American goods and services, creating a virtuous cycle of trade and investment that benefits both sides. Balanced current accounts, diversified supply chains, and stronger diplomatic ties would naturally follow – goals entirely consistent with Trump’s broader trade philosophy.

Ultimately, America’s engagement with Africa cannot succeed if it remains a transactional race for minerals alone. Tshisekedi’s remarks serve as a timely reminder: relationships matter. Respect, partnership, and mutual benefit must guide US policy if it hopes to compete with China’s entrenched position.

Africa is no longer a passive player in global affairs. It is a continent of choice, not coercion. The US must make itself a partner worth choosing – or risk becoming irrelevant in one of the world’s most dynamic and rapidly growing regions.

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Source: Weekly Blitz :: Writings


 

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